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ABSTRACT 	  
Defense acquisition programs are plagued by surging delays and cost 
overruns. In particular, contract management of defense acquisition 
programs has been identified as “high risk” - threatening project 
performance and leading to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
overpaying for projects. Empirical findings suggest that parties’ 
contractual behavior - especially the ability to work together 
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cooperatively - is an important project success factor. Empirical research 
also indicates that, in complex projects, contracts are often experienced 
as a cause of disruption of cooperation. In addressing this problem, 
contract literature has mainly focused on how to improve contracts by 
making them better enforcement mechanisms. This article takes a 
different approach. It specifically focuses on how and why the contract, 
as a legal mechanism, may obstruct cooperation. It proposes a new 
normative framework that includes other factors that influence parties’ 
contractual behavior, such as social norms and economic rationality, 
which are frequently ignored in contract design. The main observation 
this article makes is that disregarding these other dimensions leads to 
tension between the norms set forth in contracts and other non-legal 
norms that drive parties’ behavior. It explains why these tensions may 
undermine cooperative behavior and become a source of disappointing 
project results. Finally, a framework is provided for diagnosing tensions 
between the different factors at play, and design principles are proposed 
to enhance cooperation and project performance by integrating insights 
from other disciplines into contract design. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Defense contracts are a specific class of contract, however, parties 
involved encounter similar problems to those found in other complex 
contractual relationships. – It is challenging to design a governance 
structure that effectively regulates dynamic relationships and fosters 
cooperation.  
Defense construction and weapon acquisition programs are typical 
examples of complex multi-party endeavors that are governed by 
contracts and plagued by delays and cost overruns. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) is the largest contracting agency of the federal 
government, procuring approximately 370 billion USD in FY2010 
(Rendon, 2013; Ellman, Livergood, Morrow, & Sanders, 2011). The 
DoD is responsible for procurement of a range of critical supplies and 
services including commercial-type supplies, administrative services, and 
highly complex information technology systems and major defense 
weapon systems (Rendon, 2013). In this article, I focus on the last two, 
as they are the most complex and therefore seem to face the most 
problems. 
Up to now, the legal and economic literature that addresses the limits 
of complex contracts has focused mostly on problems that have to do 
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with the clarity of contracts, such as incompleteness and problems 
resulting from differences in interpretation (Grossman & Hart, 1986, 
Williamson, 1996). Little or no research, however, has been done on the 
effects of contracts on cooperation between parties or the effects that 
other dimensions of contractual behavior have on cooperation. This 
article aims to fill this void.  
Part I of this article focuses on cooperation as the cornerstone for 
good project results. It builds on findings from both contract literature 
and project management literature indicating that contracts used in 
complex projects often fail to effectively support, and may even 
undermine, cooperation between parties (O’Reilly, 1999; Walker, 
Hampson & Peters, 2000; Kamminga, 2008). Part II outlines what we 
know from literature about why today’s contracts are, fundamentally, 
imperfect devices for coordination in complex projects. It also addresses 
why contract weaknesses, such as incompleteness, are particularly an 
issue in complex defense acquisitions. This is followed in part III by an 
analysis of the largely unexplored relationship between contracts and the 
other drivers of contractual behavior, and how this has contributed to a 
breakdown in cooperation. Further, the additional factors that influence 
contracting behavior and comprise the normative framework are 
presented. Part IV then presents an analytical framework for diagnosing 
tension between these factors and proposes guiding principles for 
designing more integrated agreements.  
CONTRACTS AND COOPERATION 
Why focus on contracts 
For a number of reasons, this paper focuses on the contract document as 
a source of problems in defense projects. First of all, because contracts 
play a central role as governance mechanisms in these projects - along 
with procurement acts and regulations, the contract is the main document 
regulating the relationship between the agency and the contractor. It is 
the governance mechanism that legally binds parties to deliver work at a 
certain date for a certain price and quality level, and states the conditions 
under which this needs to be done. As such, the contract is one of the 
drivers of performance (Williamson, 1985).  
Moreover, from earlier studies on defense projects, we know that 
contracts and contract management have been identified as contributors 
to delays and cost overruns (Rendon, 2013; GAO, 2009a). In response, 
there has been a strong focus on improving the project and contract 
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management aspects of these projects. Some attention has also been paid 
to risk allocation in contracts and incentives focused on cost control in 
defense contracting (Reichelstein, 1992).  
Third, several studies have found cooperation to be an essential factor in 
project success (Iyer & Jha, 2005; Rendon, 2013). Research by the DoD 
points out that coordination between DoD agencies and contractors is 
considered essential for success, but remains a constant challenge 
(Rendon, 2013). Coordination in complex projects requires organization 
of the goals,desires and expectations among truncating parties, and the 
adjustment of behavior to accommodate the set goals between the 
purchasing agency and contractors (Salbu, 1997). However, contracts do 
not seem to effectively support cooperation. 
Contracts in complex projects 
Defense projects, such as procurement of complex systems, are the 
projects where parties need to rely on contracts the most. These projects 
are simply too complex to do without detailed contracts.  
For the purpose of this article, complex projects are endeavors that 
involve multiple parties and are multidimensional from a technical, 
organizational and/or legal perspective. They often combine technical 
and organizational complexity, as well as an intricate legal framework 
that may include procurement laws, specific regulations related to 
acquisition and other internal procedures.  
These particular characteristics make defense projects sensitive to 
disruption of cooperation. Contracts are unable to provide for all 
potential contingencies – to specify the legal consequences of every 
possible state of theproject – nor can they provide the type of adaptive 
governance needed in dynamic projects to effectively support the 
cooperative behavior essential to project success. As a result, a false 
sense of certainty may arise out of contracts in complex projects. Finally, 
add to this the typical pressures on contractual parties that comes with 
the high costs, high stakes, opposing interests, and political sensitivity of 
these types of projects(Kamminga, 2008).This places significant 
demands on the contractual framework itself. Moreover, other non-legal 
mechanisms are not working optimally in projects.   
In less complicated relationships, other factors such as reputation 
effects, reciprocity and the possibility of future trade often mitigate the 
drawbacks in contracts, but such non-legal mechanisms don’t work as 
well in complex projects. In typical long-term relationships where a 
supplier provides a service to a client, the reputation mechanisms at work 
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keep parties on a cooperative track (Lewis, 1986). There is a strong 
interest in performing well and keeping the customer satisfied in order to 
continue the relationship.  
In projects that are subject to procurement, these mechanisms are 
much less effective. The procurement system is based on selection of the 
lowest price, instead of past performance, which weakens reputation 
mechanisms - there is no longer the opportunity to build credit with a 
client in order to win the next project under procurement (Donni, 2006). 
Reputation effects that incentivize parties to be cooperative are no longer 
present (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001).  
In these circumstances, contracts need to focus on their role of 
underpinning the parties’ commitment to their obligations in a legal 
fashion, as the complexity of these large scale projects provide too many 
opportunities and temptations for opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 
2002).  
The limitations of contracts as governance mechanisms in complex 
defense projects 
Despite their importance in complex projects, contracts are often blamed 
for undermining cooperative behavior. Literature points to various 
problems with long-term complex contracts that make them defective 
instruments for organizing an optimal relationship between parties. First 
of all, these contracts have been found to be rather control driven and full 
of terms stipulating ‘what to do’ for each party, instead of focusing on 
relational aspects (MacNeil, 1978; Williamson, 1985). This can trigger a 
natural tendency for parties to seek out ways of evading their 
responsibilities as stipulated in the contract. The way contracts are 
written is likely to make parties ‘dig in’ – to take a position and defend it 
-  further undermining the cooperation process. Furthermore, contracts 
can be difficult to understand making them user-unfriendly, rigid and 
hard to adapt to a highly dynamic environment.  
Factors such as trust between parties, education and skills in 
management and leadership have been found to be essential in 
coordination, but are not triggered by contracts (Gulati, 1995). It comes 
as no surprise that referring to the contract is often regarded as a sign of 
distrust (Dimagio & Powell, 1983). Some research even indicates that 
using contracts to enforce promises may be detrimental to trust and the 
cooperation process (Macaulay, 1963; O’Reilly, 1999)  
Additional problems with contracts that have been identified relate to 
incompleteness, interpretation and changing circumstances, which can 
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lead to the need for adjustments. Particularly in complex projects these 
shortcomings come to the surface. As mentioned, mechanisms that 
would normally keep parties’ cooperation on track – such as reputation – 
do not always function well in complex projects due to the procurement 
process. Also, there is more room for opportunism than in 
straightforward transactions, more opportunity for differing 
interpretations, and therefore discussion and conflict (Williamson, 2002).  
This makes the relationship between contracts and project success 
ambivalent. On one hand, the contract gives much-needed direction to 
complete a project. Parties cannot do without a clear statement of rights 
and obligations, scope and payment terms. On the other hand, applying 
every contract term to the letter may disrupt cooperation and therefore 
undermine project success.  
The interrelationship between contracts and the other factors 
determining contractual behavior has received some attention, but is not 
really integrated into contract design literature. The literature on 
contractual behavior identifies a number of drivers ranging from the 
contract itself to social norms to economic incentives (Collins, 1999). In 
defense contracting, this includes laws, regulations and project 
management, but also more abstract structures such as culture, social 
norms and customs unique to a certain industry or business sector 
(Williamson, 2004). The argument in this literature is that behavior of 
contractual parties is influenced by the sum of the various normative 
frameworks that apply. How these frameworks relate to contract design 
has not yet been explored in much detail.  
CONTRACTS AND THE OTHER DRIVERS OF CONTRACTUAL 
BEHAVIOR 
Contracts often completely fail to take into account the other 
mechanisms that drive contract parties’ behavior, apart from the legal 
contractual rules. I will illustrate why this omission may lead to tension 
between these other drivers and the narrowly focused legal contract and 
end up undermining the cooperation process. 
Contracts are written as if their substance drives all of the parties’ 
decisions, and basically assume the contract controls parties’ behavior. 
To that end, parties’ legal obligations constitute the framework of the 
contract. Clearly, reality is different. People’s inclinations are not always 
in line with the contract language.  
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For instance, a main driver for a supplier, being an entrepreneur, will 
be his economic interest. The contract may guide him to some extent, but 
economic reward is an important determinant in his cooperation with the 
other party. Furthermore, his behavior will be influenced by customs and 
general behavioral norms. Ultimately, client and contractor may, among 
themselves, establish a practice to accomplish things that were not 
necessarily regulated. These sets of norms together establish a 
framework that people use to decide how to behave and how to judge 
others’ behavior (Collins, 1999).  
The contract often ignores at least some of these other drivers that 
determine how people behave. This would not be a problem if the 
circumstances were such that parties could simply be forced to do what 
the contract stipulates. Unfortunately, complex contracts are limited in 
their ability to effectively enforce behavior for a variety of reasons 
(Crocker & Reynolds, 1993).  
The tensions that arise due to conflicting frameworks are of a 
different nature than the tensions encountered due to incomplete 
contracts. It seems unlikely that these tensions will be resolved simply by 
investing time in making contracts more complete. 
These frictions have to do with the types of rules parties apply and 
live by, and not with a lack of clarity or incompleteness of the rules set 
forth in the contract. Clarifying the contract does not resolve an issue if 
one party believes that taking a textual approach to the contract is simply 
not appropriate from an interpersonal perspective.  
The existence and competition between sets of rules, or normative 
frameworks, is particularly relevant from the cooperation perspective 
taken in this article. After all, having different views on which sets of 
rules should apply directly affects the process of coordination and 
interaction.  
The distinction made between normative frameworks in literature is 
helpful for diagnosing the tensions that may arise. Having a better 
understanding of the relationship between these frameworks may lay the 
groundwork for addressing problems resulting from contracts’ failure to 
address them.  
The normative frameworks compared  
Contract behavior literature provides a useful description of the types of 
normative frameworks at play. Contract theorist Hugh Collins 
distinguishes three dimensions - or frameworks - that are governing the 
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actions of parties in a contractual relation: the business relation 
dimension, the economic deal dimension and the contract dimension 
(Collins 1999).  
The business relationship. The first dimension, or framework, that 
applies is that of the business relationship. This refers to the ongoing 
relationship preceding or established during the series of transactions that 
take place during the project. This relationship gets established during 
enquiries, discussions of plans and the sorting out of problems. Business 
lunches and other informal interactions sustain it. This relationship 
cultivates trust, which encourages parties to enter into transactions in the 
first place (Gulati, 1995; Macaulay, 1963; Saxton, 1997). It thrives on 
the establishment and preservation of trust. This normative framework 
also includes customary standards of trade. Actions will be evaluated 
within the framework as either demonstrations of trustworthiness or the 
opposite (Collins 1999). Contractual behavior is evaluated by how the 
parties’ actions sustain or subvert the bonds of trust (Ring & Van de Ven 
1994; Gulati 1995). 
The economic deal. A second dimension of the contractual 
relationship is the deal or agreement between the parties. Reciprocal 
obligations are created and  the economic incentives and non-legal 
sanctions are established. The framework taken into account here is 
economic rationality: both short and long term economic interest are 
considered in assessing contractual behavior. Actions are basically 
assessed from the perspective of economic self-interest. The key 
measurements concern the price or costs of performance in relation to the 
value of the expected benefits. It requires contractual performance only 
when the benefits exceed the costs of default. So, for instance, incurring 
a penalty may be rational. Acting in self-interest in the short-term is 
unlikely to lead to cooperative conduct in the long run (Granovetter, 
1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  
The contract. A third dimension is formed by the contract. This is 
another frame of reference by which to judge whether the other party has 
defaulted or cheated. However, the rules instituted by the contract are not 
necessarily in line with how the law views the conduct. Parties may 
decide to iron out the details of a potentially divisive issue in a formal 
way for the purposes of clarifying the problem and determining the 
allocation of risks and liabilities in advance. This may even be done 
when such terms would not be enforceable in front of a court. The 
contract describes how the contract ‘thinks about’ the relationship 
between the parties. It emphasizes the autonomous, un-situated 
obligations constituted by the formal agreement. The way in which the 
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contract views disputes is a framework, which isolates the transaction 
from its economic and social context. It treats the obligations undertaken 
as absolute responsibilities, firm commitments, which cannot be revised 
except through the process of revising the contract itself by agreement 
(Collins 1999). 
These frameworks are applied within the context of a particular 
project and within the context of the history of the parties’ prior 
relationship, or the reputation of parties. They are grounded in personal 
relationships and are important in the construction of market relations.  
So, from these frameworks, standards are derived that parties use to 
guide their own behavior and judge the behavior of the other party. 
Depending on the set of norms that are the dominant points of reference, 
the parties can think and converse about their relationship in different 
ways. 
The types of norms that result from the relational and economic 
dimensions are invoking obligations that are almost contrary to contracts. 
That is where tensions arise. They tend to exclude contractual thinking 
and treat it as dysfunctional, lacking the appropriate understanding of 
events and relations (Collins 1999). Conflict and competition arise when 
contractual thinking intersects with relational and economic norms based 
on solidarity - each normative system provides opposing valuations of 
conduct. 
The cooperation risks related to traditional contract design  
Generally, when designing contracts, parties only address the contractual 
dimension. In doing so, contracts artificially reduce the complexity of 
associations and social relations (Simon 1997). Such an 
oversimplification of reality has downsides - failing to take other 
normative frameworks into account can become a threat to the 
coordination process. If parties were to strictly follow the contract when 
making decisions regarding the project, the process would work. 
However, when they rely on other frames of reference to decide what 
actions to take and how to judge the other’s behavior, the contract can 
undermine its own ability to guide parties effectively and may disrupt 
cooperation.  
A purely contractual perspective ignores much of the context in which 
the agreement was made, how it fits into the prior relationship, how it 
affects others and sentiments of trust and loyalty. These factors are 
irrelevant in the construction of contracts, which is mainly concerned 
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with developing isolated commitments to the exclusion of the other 
normative frameworks. 
Contracts try to reinforce behavior that is in line with the contract 
by providing economic bonuses for living up to the contract and/or 
economic penalties for failure to comply with the contract. (Bajari & 
Tadelis, 2001). However, if parties simply choose not to follow through 
on their agreement, the contract loses its effectiveness.. One party may 
find breaking a promise and risking legal consequences a more attractive 
option, particularly when legal enforcement is costly, when survival of a 
company is at stake, or when social norms suggest they behave 
otherwise. 
So, we have arrived at the weakness of contract design this article 
focuses on – contracts tend to take only legal norms into account. What 
is evident in business and management literature seems to be ignored in 
contract design – simply having a contract does not override the 
influence of other normative frameworks.  In fact, it may lead to 
unwanted side-effects by interfering with fruitful tendencies of parties 
and missing opportunities to coordinate the drivers of contractual 
behavior (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The presence of other systems of 
norms may be disturbing from the ideal legal perspective, but they are in 
fact often useful from the perspective of cooperation. 
Approaching contracts from these other frameworks may actually 
support parties’ motivation to cooperate, increase their positive 
perception of the relationship with the other, reduce the likelihood of 
defection, or strengthen the level of trust leading to further cooperative 
behavior, such as open communication (Ryall & Sampson, 2003; 
Kamminga, 2008). These are all factors that positively influence 
cooperative behavior in working relationships in general, and the lack of 
these factors may result in distrust, or a lack of exchange of ideas and 
visions. (Macaulay 1963, Larson, 1992; Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Moreover, these other frameworks often provide the flexibility 
needed to get projects done. The contractual framework is, by nature, the 
most rigid dimension and potentially the most adversarial of the three. 
Unlike the strictly legal approach, the relational and economic 
frameworks allow for compromise, which can lead to the cooperation 
and flexibility that projects may need to succeed.  
Clearly, behavior is driven by multiple frameworks, and a different 
framework may be dominant at different times. Uncertainty arises when 
parties simultaneously rely on different frameworks, which can easily 
lead to a breakdown of cooperation.  
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Tensions between the normative structures that drive contractual 
behavior may be an important reason why cooperation fails. Focusing on 
the contract will help determine whether it is incomplete or if there is 
room for differences of interpretation, however it will not help in 
identifying the tensions created by the non-legal frameworks. Resolving 
these tensions requires a broader analysis of the governance mechanism 
driving parties’ contractual behavior. In the next two sections I propose a 
framework that may be used for detecting such tensions. It can be used 
for analyzing the extent to which existing contracts fail to take other 
forces into account. In the following section, I propose some design 
principles for integrating other normative frameworks into contract 
design.  
 
 
Assessing tensions between normative frameworks 
The analytical framework for contract design developed here focuses on 
identifying five elements: 1) the characteristics of the different normative 
frameworks at play; 2) whether tensions between them exist, and, if so, 
A) Assessment of tensions in the contractual environment:  
 
1) Identify the applicable frameworks and their characteristics 
2) Detect competition between frameworks  
3) Identify the dominant framework 
4) Find discrepancies in understanding of applied norms  
5) Identify shifts happening or that may happen 
 
B) Guiding principles for integrating normative frameworks in 
defense contract design:  
 
1) Take an interdisciplinary contract design approach 
2) Embrace and address instability 
3) Diagnose and formulate the understanding 
4) Focus on essentials, then details 
5) Identify preferred practices and norms and formulate a rule 
set  
6) Reassess  
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the nature of the tension; 3) the dominant framework at different points 
in time; 4) whether parties are in agreement aboutthe applicable 
frameworks and about the norms they set forth; And 5) if sudden shifts 
between frameworks are happening or are to be expected. 
 
The frameworks  
What are the characteristics of the different normative frameworks 
at play? The parties’ can think and converse about their relationship in 
different ways depending on the set of norms they apply.  
The frameworks I propose using are the ones identified by Collins 
described earlier. Depending on the framework used in evaluating the 
contractual relationship, divergence may exist in how the relationship is 
perceived, how the contract partners’ behavior is evaluated, and the 
measures used to take actions and evaluate the other’s actions.  
For instance, a contractor may perceive a defense project either as a 
step in an ongoing relationship, as an endeavor that is economically 
beneficial, and/or as a transaction strictly governed by contractual rights 
and duties. The measures to evaluate the contractual relationship with the 
client can be: frequent informal enquiries and discussions of plans 
(relational); strict economic rationality (deal dimension); or, strict 
interpretation of whether parties have lived up to their obligations 
flowing from the contractual rights and duties (contract dimension). 
Often, all of these dimensions will be relevant at some point in the 
contractual relationship, and parties will consciously or unconsciously 
apply a mixture of them.   
Competing norms 
Are there tensions between the frameworks, and if so, of what 
nature are these tensions? Having multiple normative frameworks 
function in parallel means that the norms they set forth may be in 
competition. Certain behavior can, for instance, be rational according to 
one set of norms and irrational according to another.  
One example is a situation in which parties reach an agreement 
about extra claims submitted by a contractor for a project that is fixed 
price, and therefore the contract does not include a clear justification to 
award the claims. Another example is a situation in which  the contractor 
exhibits flexibility to change the agreed upon deliverables to 
accommodate the purchasing agency, without any legal obligation to do 
so or added compensation. Both actions may be illogical from a 
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contractual dimension perspective, but they could very well make sense 
from an economic or relational dimension. 
The dominant framework 
What is the dominant framework at different points in time? One 
framework will often be stronger than another, but the ratio may vary 
over time. The influence of the relationship framework in contractual 
relationships can, for instance, turn out to be stronger than the 
contractual framework. This is evidenced by the presence of contractual 
behavior that is not justifiable by the contract.  
Let’s take the earlier example of a contractor asking for additional 
money for a project that was agreed upon at a fixed price. If the client 
willingly agrees to the additional payment because it makes sense to him 
from a relational perspective, the relational framework is dominant.  
When the contract  is the dominant normative framework, and the 
focus is on the detailed written terms of the agreement, there are limited 
opportunities for renegotiation, and therefore a reduction in the flexibility 
that empirical studies point out to be so important for project success. 
The following case can illustrate some of these effects. Imagine that a 
contractor developing an IT system misses a milestone by one day, but 
this has only a minor effect on the total planning and progress of the 
development of the system. The client has a number of ways to respond. 
First, he could take a strictly contractual approach and choose to apply 
the full penalty the contract stipulates for this situation. This strict 
contract approach can lead to a violation of the relational norm to behave 
proportionally to the fault, so may lead to an escalation of 
problems.Alternatively, the client could decide to mitigate the penalty, or 
allow the contractor to propose a new plan and commit to catching up so 
the end product will be delivered on time. A third option could  be to try 
solving issues amicably by following customs or introducing a give-and-
take solution. Both parties may agree on a strategy to limit consequences, 
and provide the contractor some flexibility in order to prevent disrupting 
the relationship and spending vast amounts of time discussing and 
enforcing the incurred penalty. Most likely the second and third 
approaches have a higher chance of sustaining tcooperation, but would 
perhaps not make sense from a strictly contractual perspective. 
Discrepancies in views of applied norms 
 Are parties in agreement about the applicable frameworks, the 
norms they set forth, and the one that is dominant in a certain situation? 
Parties may orient themselves toward one set of norms to the exclusion 
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of others. For instance, appeals to legal rights or written documentation 
containing the legal contract are completely justified when adopting a 
contract framework, but are likely to be regarded as a sign of bad faith or 
betrayal from a relational perspective (Collins, 1999, 134).  
First, differences in views of what framework is applicable, or is 
dominant at different times, may exist. This may vary from company to 
company, or even from person to person, since it relates to customs, as 
well as with one’s personal views of how things ‘ought to be done.’  
Parties may answer the following questions differently: Are parties 
supposed to simply follow the contract step by step, look for 
opportunities to be creative as far as the contract allows, or should they 
follow a different set of rules in day to day operations? The framework 
selected also depends on mandates companies give to their project 
managers, as well as those managers’ personal philosophy about norms 
that ought to apply in contractual relationships. These perspectives may 
vary widely from person to person, as we know from social 
psychological research about motivations and perception of relationships 
(De Dreu & Carnevale 2003). 
Further, multiple frameworks may be applied at the same time. One 
can even imagine competing normative frameworks being favored by 
different departments in the same organization. Discussions could, for 
example, arise between the legal department that drafted a contract and 
applies a strictly contractual framework, and the legal department 
involved in contract management of a project, for whom the relationship 
may be the dominant framework. 
Parties may choose different dominant frameworks and conflict about 
which is leading may arise. For example, one scenario is that both parties 
use the contract as the dominant framework. That, of course, is the ideal 
situation from a lawyer’s perspective. In scenario two, they both use one 
of the non-legal frameworks as the dominant one – the business 
relational or economic deal. This creates an unstable situation where 
parties may be forced to revert to the contract to resolve differences 
amicably, requiring a third party’s involvement. In scenario three, the 
purchasing agency may use the contract as dominant, while the 
contractor uses the business relation or economic deal framework.  
In any of these situations, there is a problem as soon as a 
disagreement arises, since each party is judging the other’s behavior 
based on different points of reference. For example, the purchasing 
agency finds that the contractor is not following the procedures as laid 
out.  The contractor justifies this by referring to a give-and-take 
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mechanism that parties developed regarding change orders allowing for 
more flexibility in dealing with minor changes, because both parties may 
need to ask for changes at different points in time.  
When these tensions arise out of differences in application and 
views, the contract comes back into play as the dominant framework. 
Ideally, this gives parties the answers they were looking for, and helps 
them stay on a cooperative track. That chance may, however, be slim in 
practice, as the contract may not provide a clear answer, or may be out of 
date and no longer reflect  what was later agreed upon between parties. 
Moreover, contracts oftentimes do not provide clear guidance that helps 
parties continue to approach issues in a cooperative manner, let alone 
lead parties back to cooperative behavior. Most of the time, the 
relationship hardens as parties dig in to their legal positions based on 
their own interpretation of the contract. 
Shifts between normative frameworks 
Are sudden shifts between frameworks happening, or to be 
expected? Another consequence of the presence of multiple frameworks 
is the potential for parties to shift between them over time. These shifts 
may go in different directions. For instance, a shift from the relationship 
as the dominant framework to a contractual approach may be responsible 
for a sudden move away from a more flexible way of dealing with 
changing circumstances towards a more rigid approach. This explains 
sudden shifts in dominant normative orientation during a dispute. On the 
other hand, when trust is built up between parties, the shift may go from 
a contractual dimension to a more relational dimension. 
The shifts that occur away from the relationship dimension are often 
more problematic. They may, for instance, happen when projects are 
under financial strain. One can imagine that it often occurs when losses 
are experienced on the side of contractors, when costs turn out much 
higher than anticipated, or when the contract was won at a price where 
margins are thin. Or, due to changes in preferences, the purchaser is 
suddenly worried about missing deadlines, and may call for stricter 
application of the contract. A strict interpretation, and narrow reading of 
the contract’s scope, can then lead to claims for change orders and extra 
work by the client. Also, shifts may occur when compromise does not 
seem to work anymore and a contractual interpretation seems like the 
only solution. 
Such circumstances may drive both purchaser and contractor away 
from a more cooperative and flexible approach towards a more rigid, 
contract driven framework. Particularly the shift from a relational to an 
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economic or a contractual framework can foster an adversarial 
atmosphere. Such a shift in the frame of reference hardens the 
relationship and leads to distrust, which may derail cooperation even 
further (Macaulay 1963, Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
Other circumstances that may result in a shift from one dominant 
framework to another are changes in leverage from one party to the 
other. This is important for understanding the contractual behavior of 
parties. For example, before the selection of the contractor is made, the 
purchasing agency has some leverage  because it is selecting one party 
from a number of contractors that are all competing to win the contract. 
After a contractor is selected and the contract is signed, leverage may 
shift to the contractor side because the client is deeply invested in the 
project.. In this situation, a post bargaining hold-up threat may arise 
(Williamson, 1985). How the contractor reacts to that new situation 
depends on the incentives he experiences. To some extent, it is 
influenced by what the contract stipulates - it hinges on how bureaucratic 
the decision process is regarding change orders that were foreseen in the 
contract.  
Also at influence are economic drivers. If the contractor takes a 
short-term economic perspective, they may decide to use their leverage 
and claim as much as possible for extra work that needs to be completed. 
On the other hand, longer-term economic drivers may lead the contractor 
not to push for more money if it may affect the chance to get follow up 
projects. The possibility of future business may even lead the contractor 
to agree to less profit,  or even a loss. The contractual behavior in these 
situations is further influenced by what is ‘done’ and ‘not-done’ in a 
particular industry.  
How and if these shifts occur likely has to do with the culture of the 
sector and of the project. Is there a give-and-take mentality, or does 
every change order lead to further negotiations and result in a discussion 
with the contract in hand? Also, it may be influenced by how responsive 
both parties are to requests, how rejections are perceived, and what the 
tone is during renegotiations. The sum of these factors could make 
parties behave more cooperatively, or more adversarial, leading to a long 
negotiation during which both parties spend many resources dealing with 
changes. 
When the contract is back in the picture, it may become apparent 
that the contract’s characteristics are not helpful in resolving differences 
of opinion, because they may be incomplete, open to multiple 
interpretations, and/or written in an adversarial manner. Moreover, the 
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only enforcement mechanisms are arbitration, or going to court, which 
are expensive and therefore not always attractive options (Scott & 
Triantis, 2006).  
Besides, as conflict increases and cooperation gets further derailed, 
much time is spent on building a legal case, further worsening relations. 
In the end, this often leads to a bad outcome for all. In other long-term 
relations, this may not be a big problem as parties may decide to 
terminate their relationship when conflicts arise, but when a project is 
half-finished, parties are deeply invested and more or less forced to 
continue, or accept a significant financial loss (Williamson, 1979).  
The existence of an array of possible scenarios illustrates the chance 
of problems arising. Better alignment and integration of the competing 
systems may break the impasse so that adherence to the old formal 
contract does not disrupt cooperation between parties.  
Rethinking guiding principles for contract design 
Integrating the different normative systems may be more fruitful 
from a cooperation perspective. Including these insights effectively into 
contract design requires revisiting the current contract design from 
mostly a legal perspective.   
Parties that embrace the frameworks  and invest in overcoming their 
discrepancies, may be better at managing their cooperation process. It 
starts with accepting that there are multiple frameworks driving 
contractual behavior. Such an approach also requires accepting that 
parties may shift between frameworks at times throughout the lifetime of 
the contractual relationship. In other words, by taking this approach, 
parties do not try to force one framework on the other, but instead take a 
more global perspective focusing on a smooth transition between the 
frameworks. This type of approach keeps parties as much as possible out 
of the ‘trenches’ and enables them to maintain or loop back to 
cooperative behavior more easily.   
Such a method demands a different approach to contracting and 
requires redesigning and adjusting the contracts that we know today. 
 
An interdisciplinary approach in contract design 
Embracing the different dimensions of contractual behavior, and 
preventing sudden shifts from one normative framework to another, 
means integrating the different frameworks in some fashion. That 
requires navigating into still unknown waters in contract design, but it 
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may offer opportunities to improve contracts as cooperation devices, 
which is difficult to do under current contract design principles.  
Integrating various dimensions into contract design may help 
overcome drawbacks of individual frameworks.  This would give parties, 
for instance, the ability to act in the spirit of the contract. Future work 
opportunities, or the shadow of the future, should also be taken into 
account.  Taking this approach may also be an opportunity to curb high 
writing costs that often undermine completeness. Yet, integrating these 
into contracts, continues to allow for oversight and legal enforcement of 
obligations. 
Design principles can be formulated, as the second part of an 
analytical framework, for doing just that.  
Embracing and addressing instability. The need to integrate frameworks 
stems from the instability that exists without them, as is the case with 
current contracts. Alternatively, parties can try venturing out of their 
comfort zone by taking the different frameworks into account in the 
contract design stage. By simply anticipating the application of the 
frameworks, they can foresee where they may compete, and anticipate 
when shifts in the dominant framework may occur.  
The first step in integrating the frameworks is to agree on making 
the contract the dominant framework. To provide a stable situation, 
parties must agree on all rules governing the relationship being 
incorporated into the contract. Of the three, it is the most stabile, and the 
most malleable and controllable framework, which means other norms 
can be imported into it.  
As described above, choosing the personal relationship or 
economics of the deal as the dominant normative framework carries the 
risk that those will be largely ignored if a legal dispute arises. Further, 
these frameworks are susceptible to change when key people leave, or 
the economics of the deal change. The contract provides the most 
certainty since it can be enforced, and it is ultimately what a court will 
consider when a dispute arises. 
Focus on essentials, then details. However, instead of starting with 
the substance of a traditional contract design, parties should initially limit 
themselves to filling in the essentials of the contract. The essentials are 
the parts that concern the substance of the project - specifications, 
conditions and scope of project and timeframe for the final deliverables.  
Formulate an understanding of the frameworks. Apart from 
documenting the contract essentials, a contract can empower parties to 
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create their own distinct understanding of the rules that should govern 
their relationship. Unlike other social institutions and types of exchange 
relationships that may trigger diffuse expectations arising from prior 
interactions, a contract can contain detailed specifications of the 
normative standards that should apply to the various aspects of the 
relationship. This gives parties the freedom to reduce the complexity of 
the association to the elements that have significance within the 
contractual framework (Collins, 15, 1999). 
The agency may want to focus on those parts of the contractual 
relationship that are not related to the characteristics of the product or 
service. That is where there is room to adjust to what both parties like 
best as the rules governing their relationship. These elements of contracts 
concern aspects that influence cooperation – the interaction and 
coordination between parties – and are where ideas can be derived from 
the other frameworks.  
Parties may use aspects from the various frameworks to determine 
how parties will proceed in their coordination of efforts. What are the 
norms they agree on? What incentives best meet their interests? What are 
workable processes to deal with change orders rapidly and at a low cost? 
Parties may decide on any process as long as it gets them to the agreed 
upon results under the set conditions.  
Identifying preferred practices and norms and formulating a rule 
set. The next step should be choosing the practices that both parties agree 
on, and that best support a cooperative relationship. The selection may be 
based on insights from psychology and economic research on the drivers 
of cooperation. Studies, for instance, can provide a good sense of the 
most common human tendencies and traits, the most acceptable social 
norms and most common triggers of economic behavior, as well as the 
possible consequences of these drivers of behavior. Considering these 
during the design stage will help lead to processes that are more likely to 
be helpful. Contract design can be underpinned by empirical knowledge 
that can help identify which processes will encourage or anchor 
cooperative contractual behavior, and which may cause issues to arise.  
Incorporate normative frameworks into contracts. The subsequent 
step should be to incorporate the rules governing the relationship into the 
contract. Parties may decide to iron out the details of any conflicts they 
expect to encounter based on a diagnosis of the contract rules.  
For example, change orders and the related decision making 
procedures. The design principle to apply here may be to meet the 
minimum requirements to make the contract malleable, measurable, and 
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specific. Integrating processes that would otherwise remain unwritten 
into a contract makes it possible for parties to refer back to what they 
agreed upon and monitor behavior. Thus they are creating enforceability 
and a certain moral commitment. Moreover, organizing the process of 
negotiating the contract in this manner can lead to parties better 
understanding of each other (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005), which further 
facilitates trust building (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002).  
Based on this analysis, a standard contract may be developed with a 
number of options regarding rules for governing the relationship that can 
be negotiated in more detail with the contractor.  
Reassessing. A second stage after a contract is signed should be to 
refine, select and incorporate the aspects of the three normative 
frameworks that both parties agree on to guide their relationship. 
 
Contract design and defense procurement policy 
 
How does this approach to contract design relate to other initiatives and 
procurement policies focused on improving defense procurement? It 
seems to fit in with at least part of the larger scheme of recent efforts in 
optimizing project performance.  
Cost and time overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
have become a high-profile problem attracting the interest of Congress, 
the government and watchdog groups. (Hofbauer et. al. 2011).  Recent 
policies focus on improvements in these areas. Rethinking contract 
design can contribute to these efforts.  
Contract management has been identified as an area needing 
attention, and studies have been carried out on the critical success factors 
to consider during the procurement process. Contracting competency 
models have been developed to increase the workforce competencies in 
this area. And, procurement process standards have been called for in the 
area of contract administration and contract close out (Rendon 2008).  
The contract design principles set forth in this paper are, however, 
different from the design principles used in most of the current contracts. 
There is a range of contracts available, but they mostly focus on 
economic incentives and are based on the principle of control that trump 
other points of reference, rather than embracing them. Various types of 
incentive programs have been studied by economists focusing on the 
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ideal level of completeness for a contract, balanced with transaction 
costs. Other approaches have been proposed in contractual literature, 
such as IPD, for specific projects, but so far there has been little attention 
on how contracts can play a role in optimally facilitating the coordination 
process between parties in any type of project by using insights from 
other disciplines and integrating them into contract design.  
This contract design approach seems to fit best in the category of 
contractual process measures, together with procurement planning, 
improving contractor selection, and contract administration.  
CONCLUSION 
 
The role of contracts in delays and cost overruns in acquisition of IT 
and defense weapon systems has received some attention, but so far the 
focus has mostly been on the control and enforcement aspect of 
contracts, rather than its potential as a coordination device for contractual 
behavior.  
Contracts appear to be insufficient instruments to effectively govern 
complex projects, particularly where it concerns encouraging cooperative 
behavior and adaptability to contingencies. Cooperative behavior has 
been found to be essential to project success, but something that 
contracts do not naturally facilitate.  
Most contract designers tend to focus on the challenge of drafting 
contracts that provide for maximum control. For instance, writing 
contracts that cover as many contingencies as possible, and reinforcing 
certain contractual duties by including bonuses and penalties. The 
underlying assumption seems to be that, in order to be effective, 
contracts need to trump other drivers of behavior such as human traits, 
social norms and customs. In contrast, this paper advocates for a contract 
design approach that embraces these other dimensions of contractual 
relationships and the accompanying normative frameworks people base 
their behavior on.  
The paper started by pointing out that findings from empirical 
studies show that current contract design does not support project 
success. It has argued that contracts may potentially damage project 
success by largely ignoring the other non-legal drivers of contractual 
behavior. While a strictly contract perspective can undermine 
cooperative behavior, other normative systems can promote it. The 
comparison of different normative systems and drivers of contractual 
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behavior, showed what contracts currently provide, and what actually 
drives parties to cooperative behavior. Competition often arises between 
norms developed within the relationship between parties, the economic 
incentives experienced, and the contractual arrangements parties made. 
This can lead to uncertainty and disagreement regarding the applicable 
points of reference that should guide contract parties’ behavior – the 
framework arising from the business relationship, the economics of the 
deal, or the contract itself. Such disagreements can be a source of conflict 
and, as such, undermine project performance. Ideas are presented for 
improving contract design by incorporating and aligning the different 
normative systems into the contract design process. Such an 
interdisciplinary approach may be needed to draft contracts that support 
cooperative contractual behavior more effectively in defense contracting.  
NOTES  
 
1 Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to acquire goods and services are 
often complex and controversial. These efforts are referred to as defense 
acquisitions. The structure DoD utilizes to plan, execute, and oversee 
those activities is an intricate and multivariate “system of systems” 
composed of the requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition 
systems. (Report of congress 2010, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD 
Acquires Weapon Systems).	  
 
2 Best Buying Power (BBP) includes 36 initiatives for implementation of 
best practices launched in 2010, encompassing a set of fundamental 
acquisition principles to achieve greater efficiencies through 
affordability, cost control, elimination of unproductive processes and 
bureaucracy, and promotion of competition. BBP initiatives also 
incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and Government, and 
improve tradecraft in the acquisition of services (DoD, BBP 2010). 
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